A release certificate describes a part's approved production or maintenance status. AOG Technics showed why a receiving team must check who issued that certificate and whether it matches the part delivered, rather than accept its appearance as proof.

For a buyer or maintenance organization, the useful action is to examine the part, its records and the named issuer together. The criminal case and a separate 2026 stolen-parts alert show why none of those checks can replace the others.

What the AOG case established

The UK's Serious Fraud Office (SFO) reports that AOG Technics sold more than 60,000 engine parts, worth £6.9 million, with forged release certificates between January 2019 and July 2023. This is a count of parts, not documents. Most were intended for CFM56 engines. The SFO estimated losses to airlines and manufacturers at more than £39.3 million, a different measure from the value of the parts sold. Source: SFO sentencing announcement, February 23, 2026.

The SFO case timeline separates the key dates:

  • The UK Civil Aviation Authority and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued safety notices on August 4, 2023. The US Federal Aviation Administration followed on September 21.
  • Director Jose Alejandro Zamora Yrala pleaded guilty to fraudulent trading on December 1, 2025.
  • He was sentenced to four years and eight months in prison on February 23, 2026. On the case page checked September 12, the prosecution is complete, while proceedings concerning the proceeds of crime continue.

The way the fraud was detected matters. According to the SFO, an airline contacted Safran to check an AOG part. Safran identified a fake certificate and alerted authorities. Independent contact with the real manufacturer helped expose the fraud. Contact details supplied by a questionable broker are a different source of evidence.

What has changed since 2023

The Aviation Supply Chain Integrity Coalition brought manufacturers, airlines and maintenance businesses together after AOG. Its October 2024 recommendations cover supplier accreditation, digital documents and signatures, receiving inspections, and control of scrap material. Accreditation means an outside body has assessed a supplier against a defined standard.

These are recommendations that leave the choice of technology open. The September 2025 progress report describes actions reported by participating companies and other survey respondents. It does not show that every aviation supplier has adopted them.

A separate case shows why physical custody also matters. EASA's stolen turbofan parts notice, revision 2, concerns material declared non-airworthy and diverted before destruction in late January 2026. The shipment comprised 12 containers, including 625 serialized parts and 9,740 non-serialized parts. A serial number identifies an individual item; a part number identifies its design or type.

The notice distinguishes the actions:

  • For identified stolen serialized items on aircraft or in inventory, EASA recommends removal and quarantine to prevent installation.
  • For listed non-serialized parts, it recommends reviewing purchase records for acquisitions after the theft period. Items of questionable origin or airworthiness should be removed and quarantined as required.

Use the notice's attachments to identify the listed items, and inform the competent national authority of new information about the case. EASA considers the stolen items unapproved and ineligible for installation. The alert does not establish that every item sharing a non-serialized part number was stolen.

Three checks when a part arrives

For a receiving team, the following is a practical review sequence, to use within its applicable procedures:

  1. Connect the records to the item. Compare the part number, serial number where applicable, physical condition and delivery records. Establish which release and maintenance documents are required for this particular part and intended installation.
  2. Check the named issuer independently. Confirm the organization and the scope of its approval through reliable authority or manufacturer channels. If the certificate needs confirmation, use contact details obtained independently of the seller. Keep a signed digital original where one is supplied so its signature can be checked.
  3. Resolve an inconsistency before accepting the part. Record the missing or conflicting information, the person handling it and the response received. Apply the relevant hold, quarantine and reporting procedures. A formatting difference or an unanswered email alone does not prove fraud.

In a fictional example, a repair shop receives a used component whose serial number differs from the release certificate. The receiver keeps it from being accepted for installation and asks for the correct records. The issuer, contacted through an independently confirmed channel, can then explain or dispute the document. A corrected clerical error and a forged certificate lead to different conclusions; the mismatch alone does not decide which occurred.

What a digital proof adds

A digital fingerprint, also called a hash, is calculated from a file's exact contents. Comparing it with a trusted recorded fingerprint can reveal a changed file. A blockchain can preserve such records across a network, subject to the network's rules and security. NIST's overview, especially sections 3.1 and 7, explains the mechanism and its limits.

The identity behind the record must still be established. A faithfully recorded false statement remains false, and an intact certificate may describe a different part. Digital signatures, issuer records and physical inspection can contribute evidence without requiring one universal blockchain design.

To examine the document side in more detail, read our guide to verification evidence that can be exported from a platform. For the AeroCert approach, see how verification works.